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Resumo
Este artigo trata do papel do Forte São Joaquim na 
consolidação da fronteira e da ocupação do vale do 
rio Branco, localizado no atual estado de Roraima. 
Busca compreender o processo de ocupação da 
região no final do século XVIII e XIX, descrever 
a política colonial portuguesa e imperial brasileira. 
Discutir questões relacionadas à memória do 
Forte São Joaquim, procurando dar maior ênfase 
aos sujeitos participantes desse processo. Além 
da discussão sobre a disputa pela memória do 
Forte São Joaquim, questão que envolve diversos 
segmentos da sociedade roraimense, memória que foi 
apropriada pelas chamadas famílias “pioneiras”, 
em que algumas delas têm suas origens ligadas a 
ex-integrantes da fortificação, e a utilizam para 
justificar suas posses e consolidar seu lugar social.
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Joaquim; Memória.
  
Abstract
This article talks about the role of  Saint 
Joaquim’s Fort in the consolidation of  the 
border and of  the occupation of  the Rio 
Branco valley, located in the current State 
of  Roraima. It strives to comprehend the 
process of  occupation of  the region in 
the end of  the XVIII and XIX centuries, 
describe the colonial policies of  the 
Portuguese and the Brazilian Empire 
alike, to discuss questions related to the 
memory of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort, trying to 
emphasize the subjects who participated in 
this process. Moreover, there is a discussion 
about the dispute over Saint Joaquim’s Fort, 
a question that involves several segments 
of  Roraima’s society, a memory that was 
appropriated by the so called “pioneer” 
families because some of  them had their 
origins bound to ex-participants of  the 
fortification and utilized them to justify 
their possessions and to consolidate their 
social place.
Keywords: Roraima; Saint Joquim’s Fort; 
Memory.
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Introduction
In the mid-XIX century, although it was little attractive for the settlers, the Rio 
Branco valley was already a reality as a non-indigenous occupation area. However, 
without an action from the Portuguese State, on the second half  of  the XVIII cen-
tury, by means of  the construction of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort and of  other occupation 
policies, it would have its realization postponed.
In this region, some European nations acknowledged the geographical area and 
of  their people before the Portuguese did, therefore they had already planned stra-
tegies with geopolitical purposes, what originated some conflicts between Spanish 
and Dutch, even though they were indirect, for the control of  the influence over the 
indigenous and for the border zone1.
The Rio Branco valley, as it was so with all Amazon, was already populated, 
at the time the Portuguese arrived, by several indigenous ethnicities, which already 
had strong social, political and cultural structure. Thus, by the time the Portuguese 
arrived in the Branco River, they came to conquer and occupy it (the term “occupy” 
means here that the non-Indian people negotiated, appropriated and, in many cases, 
expelled the autochthonous from their lands, from a region already populated by 
many ethnicities and, in addition to this, they compulsorily and violently appropria-
ted their workforce).
According to Betha Becker2, to the colonial Amazon, geopolitics functioned as 
to justify the occupation, because,
(...) por mais que quisesse a Coroa, não tinha recursos econômicos e população para po-
voar e ocupar um território de tal extensão. Portugal conseguiu manter a Amazônia e 
expandi-la para além dos limites previstos no tratado de Tordesilhas, graças a estratégias de 
controle do território. Embora os interesses econômicos prevalecessem, não foram bem--
-sucedidos, e a geopolítica foi mais importante do que a economia no sentido de garantir 
a soberania sobre a Amazônia, cuja ocupação se fez, como se sabe, em surtos ligados a 
demandas externas seguidos de grandes períodos de estagnação e de decadência3.
1 FARAGE, Nádia. As Muralhas dos Sertoes: os povos indigenas no rio Branco e a Rio de Janeiro:Paz e Terra; 
ANPOCS, 1991.
2 BECKER, Bertha K. Geopolítica da Amazônia. Estudos Avançados, São Paulo, v. 19, n. 53, 2005. Disponível 
em: <http://www.scielo.br>. Acesso em: 21 Mar 2007.
3 “Even though the Crown wanted to, it did not have the economic resources and population to populate and 
occupy a territory with such extension. Portugal could keep the Amazon and expand it further than the limits 
predicted in the Treaty of Tordesillas, thanks to the strategies of territory control. Although the economic 
interests prevailed, they were not very successful, and geopolitics was more important than economy regarding 
guaranteeing the supremacy upon the Amazon, whose occupation was done, as it is known, by outbreaks related 
to external demands followed by long periods of stagnation and decadency”.
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It is important to highlight that we will utilize the concept of  geopolitics as a 
methodological mark of  this article, even though the one we should use to interpret 
the Portuguese arguments for the possession of  the region is the concept of  Uti 
Possidetis, according to which, the rights to the territory should go to who popula-
ted it; which was conquered by the first inhabitants4.
Thus, in the search for the consolidation of  the Portuguese possession, several 
conflicts would take place during the colonial Amazon’s history, as much internal as 
external conflicts, and if  the first has not been marked by great confrontations (at 
least if  it is compared to the internal conflicts), these sure have. They were marked 
by a significant violence, especially towards the former inhabitants of  America, who, 
thanks to an ethnocentric thought and an inconsequential search for the enrichment 
of  the non-indians, were slaughtered with the progress of  the colonial conquest, 
since the first days of  the occupation by the European.
Colonial Amazon: an area in permanent dispute
If  Brazil’s coast started to receive attention from the Portuguese Crown only 
from the mid-XVI century, Amazon would still have to wait more than one century 
after the first European’s arrival to Bahia to be inserted in the Portuguese colonial 
conquest’s map. Only when there was a threat concerning the loss of  territory, Por-
tugal draws its attention to the vast region of  the Amazon River Basin.
As stated by Cardoso5 (p.38), at the beginning of  the XVII century, Dutch, Irish, 
English and French knew the region even better than the Portuguese and Spanish, 
the “owners” of  the territory since the Treaty of  Tordesillas, but they were focused 
on other problems at this time. One of  the main reasons that attracted attention 
from these European nations was the proximity from Amazon to the Caribbean 
market.
The fact that Spanish and Portuguese initially abandoned Maranhão’s and Pará’s 
coasts has offered an opportunity for pirates and French corsairs, for example, to 
explore them, as did Daniel de La Touche, lord of  La Ravardière, who was a com-
mander in the expedition of  São Luís’ foundation in 1612. He declared, when he 
articulated with the Luso-Brazilians in Maranhão in 1615, that he had made recog-
nitions in the region.
4 ANDRADE, Manuel Correia de. Geopolítica do Brasil. São Paulo: Ática, 1989, p. 30.
5 4 CARDOSO, Alírio Carvalho. Belém na conquista da Amazônia: antecedentes à fundação e os pri-meiros 
anos. In: FONTES, Edilza (org.). Coleção Contando a História do Pará: da Conquista à Sociedade da Borracha 
(séc. XVI – XIX). Belém: Editora E. Motion, 2003, pp. 32 – 58.
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The impossibility of  defending Amazon from the North of  Brazil and the ne-
cessity to occupy it, besides the natural difficulty in navigation, which made it ea-
sier to travel from Belém to Lisboa than to Salvador, made it possible for another 
Portuguese colonial area to show up in South America, directly subordinated to the 
metropolis6.
In the Amazon, with the foundation in 1616 of  the Presépio’s Fort by Francisco 
Caldeira Castelo branco, the Portuguese leave a mark in the region. From this Fort 
would emerge the city of  Belém, a place that would serve as a logistic base both for 
the Portuguese to spread their actions and missions in the Amazon River and for 
them to cast out the foreigners7.
Conforming to Cardoso8, the Portuguese Crown did not have a clear project 
of  occupation of  the Amazon lands at first; they had to occupy it only due to the 
presence of  other European nations. Besides lacking a project, they lacked also fi-
nancial resources, problem that was initially fixed by the Luso-Brazilian who lived in 
Pernambuco and their interest in ensuring the conquest.
The Portuguese were worried about occupying the region with a non-indian po-
pulation. This concern happened at first mainly at a context of  defense of  the terri-
tory. To Carvalho9 “reasons of  war” motivated the Portuguese to settle investments 
in the region, because they were not aware of  Amazon’s economical potential, only 
that its main River was an exceptional means of  communication, of  penetration into 
the enemy’s territory and of  defense against foreigners. Thus, defense became the 
main strategy-organizing power for the occupation of  the Amazon.
Nevertheless, although it was strategically planned to defend the territory from 
foreigners, the conquest of  the Amazon, according to Reis10, was spurred by eco-
nomic reasons when searching by the drugs of  the backlands, drogas do sertão, and 
motivated by the European mercantile greed from XVII and XVII centuries.
At first, to make the region economically productive and attractive, the planta-
tion system was put to trial. When it ran down, they turned their attention to the 
great workforce available (the indians) and to the large amount of  natural products 
that could be sold, offered by the forest11.
6 CARDOSO, Alírio Carvalho. Op. cit. p. 39.
7 DIAS, Maria das Graças Santos. Fundamentos da ocupação da Amazônia Colonial. Textos & Deba-tes: 
Revista de Filosofia e Ciências Sociais da Universidade Federal de Roraima, n. 5, [19--?], pp. 33 – 39.
8 CARDOSO, Alírio Carvalho. Op. cit. p. 42.
9 CARVALHO, João Renôr Ferreira de. Op. cit. pp. 35 – 36.
10 REIS, Arthur César Ferreira. A Amazônia e a Cobiça Internacional. 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civiliza- ção 
Brasileira; Manaus: Superintendência da Zona Franca de Manaus, 1982, pp. 17 – 18.
11 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Além da Conquista: guerras e rebeliões indígenas na Amazônia pombalina. 
2. ed. Manaus: Editora da Universidade do Amazonas, 2002, p. 17
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The most important among the factors that contributed for sugar and tobacco 
production in the Amazon not to go into the Portuguese exportation market were: 
the lack of  capital, bearing in mind that the mercantile bourgeoisie was more inte-
rested in the assured profit from the sugar production in the Northeast of  Brazil, 
and also the high prices for Negro slave workforce, which was inaccessible to the 
growers in the Amazon12.
According to Santos13, the extraction of  the drugs of  the backlands also came 
to substitute, partially, the Portuguese losses within the Eastern market of  spices. 
Without this economic basis, it would be impossible to occupy the Amazon valley. 
When an adequate economic activity was found, the use of  indigenous workforce 
into this activity provoked a cultural gap between European and indigenous. Hence, 
the internal conflicts in this region were launched and spurred by greed for workfor-
ce and the drugs of  the backlands14.
The dispute over the access and control about this workforce marked the 
region’s colonial history involving majorly settlers and missionaries15. Indeed, affir-
ms Chambouleyron16 (p.103), in the XVII century’s Belem, every inhabitant, either 
they were “(...) militares, senhores, estrangeiros, religiosos, oficiais e em alguns casos 
até os chamados ‘pobres’, tinham índios para seu serviço”17.
Santos18 highlights that the Portuguese advancement in the Amazon, which pro-
voked the confrontation against the indigenous, was realized by several agents, who 
quarreled also among themselves, in such a way that almost these confrontations 
revolved around one objective only: controlling the indigenous workforce.
Among the most important laws in the colonial period in the Amazon one can 
find the Missions Regiment, in 1686, which, according to Vieira19, among its most 
significant aspects, it brought with it, for the control of  the religious orders, the 
temporal and political administration over the indigenous workforce, along with the 
spiritual control they already had, what represented an exceptional victory to the 
missionaries over the settlers with the endorsement of  the Portuguese crown.
12 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. p. 24.
13 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. pp. 18 – 19.
14 DIAS, Maria das Graças Santos. Op. cit. p. 34.
15 Id.Ibid. p. 35.
16 CHAMBOULEYRON, Rafael. Belém e seus moradores no século XVII. In: FONTES, Edilza (org.). 
Coleção Contando a História do Pará: da Conquista à Sociedade da Borracha (séc. XVI – XIX). Belém: Editora 
E. Motion, 2003, pp. 84 – 110.
17 (...) military, landholders, foreigners, religious people, officers and, in some cases, even the so-called ‘poor’ 
had gone to their service”.
18 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. pp. 33 – 34.
19 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Missionários, fazendeiros e índios em Roraima: a disputa pela terra – 1777 a 1980. 
Boa Vista: Editora da UFRR, 2007, p. 11.
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The missionaries’ action was marked by ambiguity, as states Chambouleyron20, 
because, at the same time they denounced the excesses made by the settlers, getting 
in conflict against them, they participated in the commercial world, for they needed 
to keep alliances with the colonial authorities or powerful settlers in order to survive. 
This practice has been repeated throughout centuries in the Amazon, and it keeps 
happening at a great part of  the conservative churches, either they are Catholic or 
not.
Through Pombal’s administration of  the Portuguese government, the Amazon 
starts to be a privileged area when he names his half-brother Francisco Xavier de 
Mendonça Furtado to rule it. This attention, as says Dias21, was provided by the 
recent signature of  the Treaty of  Madrid, in 1750, between Portugal and Spain, 
through which Portugal acquired the possession of  a vast extension in the North of  
its colonial area, its administration now thinking about economic alternatives that 
could promote development to the Amazon.
Pombal’s policies found that the Amazon represented great economic possibi-
lities to Portugal, and that the frequent conflicts between settlers and missionaries 
should be solved so that it could be realized, because this question influenced di-
rectly over the colony’s production and its capacity as a provider of  spices and raw 
material22.
The most significant actions taken by Pombal concerning the Amazon were: the 
drastic modifications that happened in the policies related to indigenous workforce; 
the implementation of  a commerce company that functioned during more than 
twenty-two years (1755-1778) having as goals to introduce African slaves by credit, 
to spur agriculture and to develop commerce in the region; to redistribute (among 
military and individuals) the properties that had been confiscated from the Jesuits, by 
donating or selling them, to reformulate and broaden the Portuguese local adminis-
trative machine; and to transform old missions into villages and communities with 
new Portuguese names23.
The Law called Directory that one must observe within the Indian peoples of  
Pará and Maranhão while His Majesty did not tell the contrary, was signed by the 
king D. José I in August 17, 1757, and first applied only to the States of  Grão-Pará 
and Maranhão, being applied in the next year into every Portuguese conquest in 
20 CHAMBOULEYRON, Rafael. Em torno das Missões Jesuíticas na Amazônia (século XVII). Lusi-tânia 
Sacra, Volume 15, Segunda Série, 2003, pp. 19 – 20.
21 DIAS, Maria das Graças Santos. Op. cit. p. 36.
22 CARVALHO, João Renôr Ferreira de. Op. cit. p. 108.
23 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. pp. 46 – 47.
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America, and prevailing until May 12, 1798, when it was striked down by D. Maria 
I24.
Pombal and Mendonça have planned to elevate indigenous to the condition of  
Crown subordinates, to guarantee the “precarious possession of  the colony”; since 
the Treaty of  Madrid was signed, it was necessary to populate all the territory with 
Portuguese people, in that case inserting Indians into the Portuguese colonial society 
and creating villages and settlements with Portuguese names25.
Brandão26 emphasizes that the “(...) orientações e determinações para redefinir e 
pôr em prática a nova política de integração social para os índios do Brasil (...)27” par-
ted from Pombal and Mendonça Furtado’s stubbornness, but mainly the second’s, 
knowing that when he was named Comissary to the demarcation of  borders and was 
in expedition through the region of  the Arraial de Maruá (Barcelos), where he faced 
the diseases and setbacks of  the forest, his eagerness against religious orders increa-
sed, especially against the Society of  Jesus, because of  the control they had over the 
indigenous workforce, blaming them for all lack of  success in the task they should 
be realizing, for the lack of  food and oarsmen and for the Spanish commissary’s 
absence.
Over and above, there was also the conflict between settlers and missionaries, 
which was promoted by plots from the settlers who could not obtain indigenous sla-
ve workforce so easily to work on the ploughing or on the gathering of  spices, and, 
besides, did not tolerate wealth superiority from the religious orders28.
The Directory has proposed deep modifications on the indigenous policies the-
re were in the Amazon. Thus, in the settlements, the temporal government would 
be done by the Principals, the main indigenous leaders, over their people. There was 
also a Director (civil administrator) to lead the processes of  settlement and a missio-
nary for the spiritual part of  it. People were compelled to speak Portuguese, as well 
as having a Portuguese surname. Moreover, the Directors (who substituted the mis-
sionary administration) got a sixth part from everything the indigenous produced, 
and took care of  their salaries29.
24 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. pp. 46 – 47.
25 DIAS, Maria das Graças Santos. Op. cit. p. 38.
26 BRANDÃO, Sylvana. Op. cit. pp. 261 – 262. Id.Ibid. p. 265.
27 “(...) guidelines and instructions to redefine and put in practice the new policy of social integration to the 
Indians of Brasil (…)”.
28 Id.Ibid. p. 265.
29 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. Pp. 49-52.
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Speaking of  the Indian Directory, Almeida30 shows that there was a necessity 
to fortify the State; if  Church was in an inferior position concerning administration. 
Because the Society of  Jesus did not want to undergo the State’s authority, it was ex-
pelled from Portuguese territories on September 3, 1759, ending the State’s conflicts 
with the Ignatians. The substitution of  Jesuits, as well as missionaries form other 
religious orders, was gradual, though31.
Pombal’s Directory did not achieve the immediate results the Portuguese ad-
ministration waited for. Thus, even to the colonial authorities, the Director of  the 
Indians was mainly responsible for the Directory to have failed. According to San-
tos32, this administrator, in Ribeiro de Sampaio’s concept, was bearer to two almost 
unbeatable obstacles: “ignorance and greed”. The result is that thirty years later the 
colony still stood on the starting spot, led by Directors with the same profile Ribeiro 
de Sampaio has shown in his analysis.
It seems to Santos33 that the Director of  the Indians was directly responsible 
for the fail of  the Directory. However, another part of  this fail was represented by 
the Principals’ capacity for articulation inside the settlements, what created a false 
obedience, run-aways, desertions, rebellions and indigenous wars, as a result of  the 
antagonist political conflicts, an Indigenous and an Indigenist.
A great example of  indigenous resistance to the Portuguese conquest were the 
Manaos in the year of  1720. Farage34 believes that the confrontation between Ma-
naos and Portuguese has happened by virtue of  economic factors, because besides 
extinguishing mediators from the slave market with the Dutch, this war would serve 
also to expand the slave supplying area onto the colonial area. With the fall of  these 
Indians, in 1730, the routes to Negro and Branco Rivers would be opened to the 
seizure of  indigenous. Those regions would then have their population reduced in 
a short time35.
Thus, in the mid-XVIII century, the Branco River starts to integrate the syste-
matic slave supplying market to Belém and São Luis. It was not a seizure from time 
to time anymore, but a business that was funded by the State to supply Maranhão 
and Grão-Pará, places that always needed workers for the ploughing36.
30 ALMEIDA, Rita Heloísa de. O Diretório dos índios: um projeto de “civilização” no Brasil no século XVIII. 
Brasília: Editora UNB, 1995, p. 115.
31 Id.Ibid. pp. 121 – 123.
32 SANTOS, Francisco Jorge dos. Op. cit. pp. 57 – 58.
33 Id.Ibid. pp. 61 – 62.
34 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. p. 65.
35 Id.Ibid. p. 67.
36 Id.Ibid. p. 68.
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With the appliance of  Pombal’s Directory, from the high number of  indigenous 
that populated Grão-Pará and Maranhão, few were taken as Crown subordinates. 
Some have gone back to the forest, returning to the lifestyle they had before the 
Portuguese settlements, but the great part of  them was wiped out, so the Amazon 
started to suffer “(...) um intenso processo de despovoamento, a partir de 175037”.38
To Farage39, in the fights for the Branco River territory, from the decade of  
1770, the indigenous - those who were settled by Portuguese or trading with the 
Dutch in Essequibo - participated actively on the construction of  the colonial bor-
ders, looking for advantages; for the colonizers, the indigenous political submission 
meant a warranty for the possession of  the territory.
It is important to see that with either the Portuguese advancement into the 
Amazon, or even of  other nations in other areas of  America, the indigenous were 
not passive, they have been an active agent that forged alliances and found ways to 
satisfy some of  their own interests.
Portugueses in the Rranco River
The Portuguese reports about the Branco River were extremely vague concer-
ning their discovery, which was guessed (without any real proof) by Francisco Xavier 
Ribeiro de Sampaio and Joaquim Nabuco - the first wrote in the XVIII century, and 
the second in the XX, about Pedro Teixeira’s trip from Belém to Quito, between 
1673 and 1639. It appeared also in the Jesuit Christobal de Acuña’s crhonicles, who 
accompanied Teixeira40.
To Farage41, the documents about the Branco River date from the XVIII cen-
tury, but increase their volume from the decade of  1730, since an official expansion 
to the region was taking place at this time, by means of  the rescue troops that start 
to search for Indians in this area.
The existence of  this not-documented period does not mean that the region 
had not been visited by Portuguese, but that the exploitation activities that had taken 
place there (the extraction of  the drugs of  the backlands and the indigenous seizure 
by individuals) were commonly illegal.
37 “(...) an intense process of depopulation, from 1750”.
38 BRANDÃO, Sylvana. Op. cit. p. 274.
39 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. pp. 18 – 19.
40 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 10.
41 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. p. 56.
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In accordance with Farage42, to understand the Portuguese expansion on the 
Negro River and afterwards in the Branco River, it is necessary to comprehend that 
in the end of  the XVII century the areas that were closer to Belém have been gradu-
ally decreasing their capacity to supply indigenous slave workforce, culminating with 
a sentence against the Manaos for being allied to the Dutch that lived in Guyana, hel-
ping on their trade network between manufactured products and indigenous slaves. 
The first rescue troops (official or not) have already been well described in Farage’s 
book, which is cited here, as well as in Vieira’s.
What has surprised the Portuguese most was the fact that Spanish had gone 
through the mountain range that separated the Orinoco River’s basin from the Bran-
co River’s basin, what they believed would be a natural defense. This fact put all the 
Portuguese defense system in the Amazon at stake, for the fortresses they built at 
other spots of  the frontier would not matter if  the access to the Negro River was 
free when crossing Branco River. That was not about a regular meeting, as happened 
in the case of  the Dutch, but as an initiative from the Spanish State in order to attach 
the region to the Castela domination.
The situation showed up to be more complicated to Portugal due to the political 
moment of  their relations with Spain regarding their colonial borders, bearing in 
mind the 1750’s Treaty of  Madrid had been struck down and gave place to El Pardo 
in 1761, and that the two nations would only make peace about this subject in 1777. 
That is to say that, at that moment, the colonial borders were uncertain, and that the 
areas that had already been occupied would be important for future negotiations43.
The complex conjuncture that there was in the Branco River made from that 
issue a central priority for the Portuguese44, and to avoid threats about losing their 
territory they decided to build up a fortification and to invest in indigenous settle-
ments as a strategy to effectively occupy the Branco River45.
We realize by seeing the Royal Provision of  November 14 in 1752, that the pri-
mal reasons for the construction of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort were the Dutch incursions 
in the region of  the Rio Branco valley46, an order that was not executed by Men-
donça Furtado. Thus, this order would only be obeyed in 1775, due to the exposed 
reasons, the necessity of  a military base to the region47.
42 Id.Ibid. pp. 61 – 62.
43 Id.Ibid. pp. 122 – 123.
44 Id. Ibid. p. 123.
45 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 18.
46 ALMADA, Manuel da Gama Lobo de. Op. cit. pp. 657 – 658.
47 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 18.
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When Leclerc arrived to Barcelos in 1775, on October 3, an expedition com-
manded by Captain Phelippe Sturm, who was a German official engineer who ser-
ved the Portuguese Crown, parted from the captaincy towards the Branco River – it 
was enhanced with military sent from Belém. They went after the Spanish without 
finding any resistance as soon as they got to the region, and conquered São João Ba-
tista in the margins of  the Tacutu River. The Spanish fugitives who were refugees in 
the Santa Rosa’s Fort, in Uraricoera, fled again when they heard about the approach 
of  the Portuguese war troops48.
Between the years of  1775 and 1776, the building of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort was 
initiated on the right coast of  the Tacutu River, at where the River meets the Urari-
coera and forms the Branco River. It was a strategic position because it would stop 
Spanish and Dutch to go further towards Branco River, preventing any foreign in-
cursion into the Negro River49.
The importance of  the Branco River to the Portuguese Crown was in the fact 
that at this point the barrier was the limiting area between the Portuguese territory 
and those dominated by Spanish and Dutch. This was the first advantage the Portu-
guese could have in this region50 (SAMPAIO, 1850: 266 - 267).
Saint Joaquim’s Fort was part of  the many Portuguese fortifications that sur-
rounded the Amazonian domains in the XVIII century, closing the main accesses to 
the inner region of  the Amazon. These were the accesses: the Branco River (Saint 
Joaquim’s Fort), Negro River (Saint José de Marabitanas’ Fort - Cucuí and Saint 
Gabriel’s Fort), Solimões River (Tabatinga’s Fort) and Guaporé River (Príncipe da 
Beira’s Fort). This arch completed what there already had been in the estuary of  the 
Amazonas’ River, besides those that deepened the defenses51 (BENTO, 1975:51 - 
52).
We can see in the picture below the ground plan of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort, drawn 
in the XVIII century, as a result of  Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira’s passage through 
the Rio Branco valley in 1786. Rodrigues Ferreira’s drawing was the only such map 
we have always had access to in our researches, outlining all the others to the ground 
plans that were copied from the one team Viagem Filosófica de Ferreira.
48 Índios de Roraima. Boa Vista: Centro de Informação Diocese de Roraima, 1989, pp. 14 – 15.
49 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. p. 123.
50 SAMPAIO, Francisco Xavier Ribeiro de. Relação Geographica Histórica do Rio Branco da América 
Portugueza (1777). In: SAMPAIO, Francisco Ribeiro de. Relação Geographica Histórica do rio Branco da 
américa Portuguesa (1777). In: Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geographico Brasileiro - Tomo XIII. Rio de 
Janeiro, n° 18, 1850, pp. 200 – 273.
51 BENTO, Cláudio Moreira Maj. Op. cit. p. 53.
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Ground Plan from Saint Joaquim’s Fort52
During its existence, Saint Joaquim’s Fort was charged with the task to conduct 
the region’s administration to the Portuguese Crown and then to the Brazilian Im-
perial Crown. Its first task within this purpose was the constitution of  indigenous 
settlements in the region, which, believed Farage, was also triggered quickly and 
effectively, since when the work to build the Fort took place, indigenous workforce 
was already used, brought for this purpose, besides that kind one could find in the 
Spanish settlements in the Uraricoera53.
The fortification became a State administrative hand in the Branco River, lea-
ding and applying the Portuguese geopolitics to the region, what resulted in several 
conflicts against the local indigenous population since the first moments, what me-
ant in effect the difficulty to accomplish part of  their administrative tasks.
Around the Fort the first non-Indian habitation nucleus in the Branco River and 
its thereabouts; In 1777, the indigenous settlements, “(...) Nossa Senhora do Carmo, 
Santa Isabel, Santo Antônio e Santa Bár-bara no próprio rio Branco; São Felipe, no 
Tacutu; Nossa Senhora da Conceição no Uraricoera”54 have been formed.
The investment made in the indigenous settlements system of  the region got 
to the point in which there were 1019 individuals: settled indigenous, most of  them 
52 Available in <www.cfrr7bis.eb.mil.br>. Acesso em: 10 de março de 2008.
53 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. p. 123.
54 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 22
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were men, what demonstrates the great efforts of  the Portuguese Crown in assuring 
the occupation of  the territory from the settlement system55. However, the first 
tentative to settle along the Branco River fell in 1781 and the system was almost 
completely destroyed by the indigenous insurrection against the Portuguese soldiers 
that used to rule56.
The trigger of  the series of  revolts seems to have been the visit that Friar José 
de Santo Antonio paid to the settlement of  São Felipe in April, 1870, when he tried 
to pressure Roque, an Indian, to break up with the woman he lived with, since he 
had been already married in the Carvoeiro people, in the Negro River. After this 
attempt of  coercion, the indigenous’ discontent exploded and the rumors of  an es-
cape started to spread over São Felipe57. Several prisons, escapes and acts of  violence 
happened again during 1780 in all settlements, even though only Nossa Senhora do 
Carmo was not abandoned58.
As an evidence to the importance of  the indigenous in the occupation of  the 
territory, to be utilized as the “outbreak walls”, and the lack of  resources to invest 
in a strategy that could count on the movement of  non-Indians to the region, the 
Crown starts a second attempt to create settlements, by means of  the institution of  
four settlements as of  1784, in place of  those that were abandoned by the indige-
nous, which were: Nossa Senhora da Conceição, São Felipe, São Martinho and Santa 
Maria59.
On the contrary to what the Portuguese waited for, this second attempt to crea-
te settlements suffered a huge failure, since it has never outnumbered the first settle-
ments, then the Portuguese could not transform them into stable population nucleus 
and, consequently, in autonomous units of  production60.
As to prove the importance of  a strategy for the occupation of  the Rio Branco 
valley by means of  settling there even though they had to deal with difficulties and 
unproductivity, the Portuguese have maintained the settlements for many years and, 
as believes Farage61, they would have maintained them for a longer time if  the Portu-
guese occupation politics had not suffered another modification with 1970’s revolt.
The second cycle of  revolts within the settlements of  the Branco River is set up 
due to the rising deterioration of  the people’s life conditions, having no perspective 
55 Id. Ibid. p. 24.
56 Id. Ibid. p. 26.
57 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. P. 131.
58 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. P. 26.
59 Id. Ibid. pp. 132 - 134.
60 FARAGE, Nádia. Op. cit. pp. 136 - 137.
61 Id. Ibid. p. 140.
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of  solving their problems, as hunger was only mitigated by the distribution of  ma-
nioc flour that came from the Negro River. On the other hand, there was the burden 
created by Portuguese over the civil administrators, charging from them the mainte-
nance of  the number of  settled indigenous, what made the relations more tense62.
Facing the uprising, even Lobo D’Almada, who used to defend a humanist dis-
course that involved a gentle treatment towards Indians, decides to punish the rebels 
because, in his opinion, without that it would be impossible to keep a garrison in the 
region, as well as to keep control over the settled population that was still there63. 
Now, they depreciated the Indians, who did not serve for their purposes anymore, 
calling them “aqueles comedores de farinha”64.
In spite of  the problems faced on this last cycle of  revolts, the Portuguese 
did not give up on their project of  occupation of  the Rio Branco valley with the 
indigenous population. From this moment on, it was recommended to the Fort’s 
commander that the settled people should be treated more gently. The only, and 
very significant, change that happened in this occasion was that rom this period the 
settlements in the Branco River would be administrated by married civilians, and 
then the military would go to the military garrisons. It made clear that the results 
of  the uprising had left back some doubts about the military performance on the 
Portuguese project of  occupation in the Branco River by means of  settlements65.
In the end of  the XVIII century, considering that the settlements had failed in 
the Branco River, a new project of  occupation would be adopted, showing the Por-
tuguese eagerness about keeping the possession of  the territory. Thus, due to a lack 
of  mercantile activity that would please not only the non-Indian, a livestock culture 
was introduced with the creation of  the “royal farms” and the first try of  raising cat-
tle, in order to intensify the Portuguese State’s presence in the upper Branco River66.
The commander of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort himself, by this time Captain Nicolau 
Sá Sarmento, has founded the São Marcos farm, in a region next to the fortress, 
while the São José farm has been founded by captain José Antonio Évora, who ow-
ned and lived in many possessions along the Negro River, and the São Bento farm 
by Lobo D’Almada, as a “royal” farm. These farms have become the first nuclei for 
introduction of  the livestock in the Branco River67.
62 Id. Ibid. p. 134.
63 Id.Ibid. pp. 164 – 165.
64 “Those manioc flour eaters”.
65 Id.Ibid. p. 167.
66 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 33.
67 Índios de Roraima. Op. cit. p. 20.
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According to Farage and Santilli68 (p. 272), these two farms which were in hands 
of  individuals at the turn of  the XVIII and XIX centuries, with the death of  cap-
tain Sá Sarmento, who did not leave heirs, São Marcos starts to be property of  the 
Crown, and after the bankruptcy of  Évora family in the Negro River, their assets, 
including São José farm in the Branco River, were auctioned, and as they have not 
been leased, they were taken by the Portuguese State.
As state Farage and Santilli, it is important to perceive that the three farms have 
been created to compensate the lack of  civil colonization. Their area covered all the 
region of  the upper Branco River, which was property of  the Portuguese State, and 
all of  them were administered by the commander of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort, whose ad-
ministrative actions were reported directly to the governor of  the captaincy of  São 
José do Rio Negro and to the Treasury Department. This commander was placed as 
a State Representative in the region for a long time.
In the end of  the XVIII century, the experience of  Portuguese Colonization 
in the Rio Branco valley, the only option for economic exploitation in the region 
was livestock activity. Its goal was to integrate the area to the Portuguese America’s 
internal market and make it attractive to the establishment of  non-Indian settlers.
Livestock, though, seemed at first a doubtful investment, since extractivism in 
other areas of  the Amazon was a more profitable and secure activity. However, 
some non-Indian got attracted by the large amount of  natural pasture existing in the 
Rio Branco valley, the indigenous workforce that abundant and cheap, and by the 
possibility to easily initiate the activity by just capturing some cattle and establishing 
onto a specific area69.
We should consider the economic landscape of  the Amazon from the mid-XIX 
century, when the main activity had turned to vegetal extractivism; livestock that 
took place in the Rio Branco valley was then a side activity, even more so because of  
the difficulties in transportation, so it lingered for a long time, up to the end of  the 
XIX century, as an activity for subsistence and that sponsored vegetal extractivism70.
Nevertheless, from this initiative, private farms started to multiply, as much as 
in the areas that had been occupied by royal farms as in areas outside them, which 
means that, at the exception of  São Marcos, farms like São José and São Bento have 
been occupied by landholders in the beginning of  XIX century or have been usur-
68 FARAGE, Nádia; SANTILLI, Paulo. Estado de sítio: territórios e identidades no vale do Rio Branco. In: 
CUNHA, Manuela Carneiro da. (Org.). História dos Índios no Brasil. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras/
Secretaria Municipal de Cultura/FAPESP, 1992, pp. 267 – 278.
69 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 34.
70 FARAGE, Nádia; SANTILLI, Paulo. Op. cit. p. 273
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ped by their former administrators and tenants that would become then great rural 
owners by appropriating illegally from public patrimony71, advancing also towards 
the indigenous lands, what has been generating a series of  agrarian conflicts reflec-
ted until nowadays.
On the contrary to what happened in other areas of  livestock development, as 
in Piauí and Mato Grosso, where indigenous populations were either expelled or 
wiped out, in the Branco River the appropriation of  lands to raise cattle was follo-
wed by the inclusion of  indigenous to the lowest layers of  society that was being 
formed, for in the process of  occupation it was necessary to find a social place for 
the Indian72.
Livestock activity in the Rio Branco valley was an idea of  the Portuguese State; 
it was pushed ahead by individuals, and created a series of  disputes that still reflect 
themselves on Roraima’s society. The first field for disputes was between the first 
farmers over the indigenous workforce. Then this dispute started to be over the lan-
ds of  the Indians, who were expelled from their own initial occupation area before 
the non-Indian arrived. The results of  this conjuncture was the showing up of  great 
farmers in the region and finally of  a basis for economic sustainment to the Branco 
River, between the end of  the XIX century and the beginning of  the XX73.
Thus, as the border issues between Brazil and the English Guyana were moved 
to the diplomatic field since 1842, Saint Joaquim’s Fort was not anymore a decisive 
factor to the Brazilian occupation of  the Branco River by military means74. However, 
there still was its contribution as a proof  to Portuguese presence in the region, a 
point that was explored by Joaquim Nabuco very well.
An important fact is that the Freguesia de Nossa Senhora do Carmo was esta-
blished as an administrative Head Office of  the region of  Branco River75 through 
the Provincial Law of  1858 (Law nº 92, from November 9, 1958), which set the 
borders of  the Province of  Amazonas. This change attended to the administrative 
reformations of  the Empire, making a parish from the populational agglomeration 
that occupied the thereabouts of  Fazenda de Boa Vista, founded in 1830 by Inácio 
Lopes de Magalhães, by means of  the edification of  a parish church76 (OLIVEIRA, 
2003, p. 94).
71 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 35
72 FARAGE, Nádia; SANTILLI, Paulo. Op. cit. p. 268.
73 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 36.
74 FARAGE, Nádia; SANTILLI, Paulo. Op. cit. p. 271.
75 VIEIRA, Jaci Guilherme. Op. cit. p. 37.
76 OLIVEIRA, Reginaldo Gomes de. Roraima: um olhar histórico e sócio-político do século XVI ao XIX. In: A 
herança dos descaminhos na formação do Estado de Roraima. Tese de Doutorado – Universidade de São Paulo, 
São Paulo, 2003, pp. 17 – 99.
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Thus, with the foundation of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort and the creation of  the “royal 
farms”, with the introduction of  cattle onto the farmlands of  the upper Branco 
River, a small group of  European culture settled in the region and stood against the 
autochthony, and originated a social and political sector. Military have got married 
to the Indian women and formed families, what was encouraged by colonial autho-
rities, while the highest-levelled militaries have brought their families with them, 
commonly from Northeast. The descendants of  these militaries became farmers by 
appropriating from public lands and incorporating elements that arrived late. At the 
turn of  XIX century to the XX century a society typically patrimonial was formed, 
then77.
With the transformation of  the Branco River into a municipality based in Boa 
Vista, in 1890, after the advent of  the Republic in Brazil, the Fort was deactivated by 
1900, when it started to be materially abandoned. In 1944, the stones that had been 
used on the foundations and walls of  the facilities of  the Posto do Serviço de Pro-
teção aos Índios (SPI), located at the São Marcos farm, along the Uraricoera River, 
were taken off  their former seawall78.
Saint Joaquim’s Fort is found into this society on the second half  of  the XX 
century as an object for dispute, since each family that has been formed and con-
solidated in the region tries to present itself  as more traditional than the others, 
using the Fort, the most expressive element of  the definite Portuguese conquest of  
the Branco River, as a starting point to prove their rights to specific areas or public 
offices.
Final considerations
Saint Joaquim’s Fort represented, until the second half  of  the XIX century, the 
core of  the political activity in the Rio Branco valley. It served as a hand, first to the 
Portuguese State and afterwards to the Branco River, since it had the competence 
of  administering the region, managing geopolitics of  non-indigenous occupation 
on the frontiers of  the far North of  Brazil, concerning its political and economic 
aspects.
Many men have come out from the Fort to become land owners, almost always 
appropriating themselves from lands of  the State that were part of  the old royal 
77 ANTOS, Nelvio Paulo Dutra. O Estado Nacional Brasileiro e a Amazônia. Políticas públicas, economia e 
poder: o estado de Roraima entre 1970 e 2000. 2004. Tese (Doutorado em Desenvolvimento Sustentável do 
Trópico Úmido) – Universidade Federal do Pará, Belém, 2004, p. 84.
78 BENTO, Cláudio Moreira Maj. Op. cit. p. 53.
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farms, then national farms. Thus, Saint Joaquim’s Fort had a considerable period 
of  great importance in this moment of  Portuguese occupation on the Branco Ri-
ver since the time it was first built (in 1775). It has contributed even to the field of  
diplomatic decisions about the border limits with the neighbor countries, because 
it served as an alibi to the presence of  the government in the Branco River region.
Its importance to the period is emphasized at the moment we realize that even 
though the nucleus of  non-indigenous occupation was moved to Boa Vista (decade 
of  30 in the XIX century), its role is undeniable, for it continues up to the first part 
of  the XX century and without its presence as a hand of  the State in all the spheres 
we pointed out, it would be hard to consolidate the occupation of  the region.
Notwithstanding the loss of  its central role to Boa Vista, where many members 
of  the Fort lived, livestock started in the end of  the XVIII century would not have 
developed without this support from the State, because in the case of  the occupa-
tion of  the Rio Branco valley, the State had to act out the role of  the individuals, 
by means of  fortification, in the first years, due to the difficulty of  creating an eco-
nomic activity that would attract great private investments and offer support to the 
occupation.
In fact, it is (or was) discussed a lot about Saint Joaquim’s Fort in Roraima, and 
we believe we make a new approach that can effectively contribute to the historical 
studies about the Rio Branco valley at the colonial period, or even at the Empire 
period. Moreover, in several occasions, social groups and segments related to the 
governmental sector have mobilized to try to restore the site where Saint Joaquim’s 
Fort was located without clearing up to Roraima’s society their real role in the Por-
tuguese establishing in the Branco River, a spot of  great relevance, as well as doing 
a real archeological work on the place, restoring it.
When it was deactivated by 1900, stones were taken from the walls and founda-
tions of  the facilities of  the Posto do Serviço de Proteção aos Índios (SPI), located 
in the São Marcos Farm, in the Uraricoera River, in 1944. Over the years, there were 
several attempts and projects to restore the historical value of  Saint Joaquim’s Fort, 
initiated, according to our research, with an article made by the military major Cláu-
dio Moreira Bento in 197579.
If  the memory from those who were excluded from society can be pointed out, 
as it has already been done with the objective of  turning Roraima’s history into a 
more democratic history, to which every historical subject could have the place they 
indeed occupied in the realization of  the conquest of  the lands in the upper Branco 
79 BENTO, Cláudio Moreira Maj. Op. cit.
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River in the XVIII and XIX centuries, after all it was not only the Fort’s comman-
ders and their relatives this society was made by, there were many more conflicts and 
confrontations than the old local bibliography is capable of  showing us.
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